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Background
• Ballooning public debt forces DoD to 
rethink its procurement strategy.     
• Congressional testimony urges DoD    
to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon 
systems that are affordable” 
(M. Sullivan, GAO 2009) 
2
Background
Cost as an Independent Variable     
(CAIV)
• “Cost and affordability should be a 
driving force not an output after 
potential solutions are established ”   .
(Larsen, 2007 p. 15)
3
Background
• Hitch and McKean (1967), advocate 
determining the maximum effectiveness    
for a given budget, and then examining 
how each alternative fares under several      
different budget scenarios.  
• Quade (1989) advocates evaluating 
vendor proposals based on a range of 
possible budgets.  
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Introduction
Procurement Goal:•   
–Select vendors that deliver the best 
combination of desired non-price 
attributes at realistic funding levels    .
• New approach to vendor selection:    
–Multi-attribute sealed-bid procurement 




– Provide a more complete view of vendor’s ability to perform 
under different budget scenarios.
Develop a new Vendor Selection Metric (VSM) for vendor–          
selection decisions
• Three Stage Procurement Model    
1)Government offers a set of possible funding levels.
2)Vendors offer proposals for each budget.     
3)Government selects vendor.
“E i th ” f h d l h• xpans on pa s  or eac  ven or, revea  ow 
vendor proposals change as funding changes.
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Three Stage Procurement Model
• Based on “Economic Evaluation of Alternatives” (EEoA)* 
1) DoD reveals desired attributes and a set of 
possible funding levels for the program
2) Vendor proposals consist of sets of non-
price performance attributes for each     
possible funding level
3) DoD selects vendors according to its      
weighting of attributes (i.e. a multi-attribute 
value/utility function) 
* Page 25-28 in Melese, F. “The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives,” Proceedings of the 6th Annual 
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Model
• n vendors
• m attributes (A)
• k possible budget levels B (1 k)   ,    ,…,
• Vendor offers                        for each funding level
D D l f ti (MOE) i
[ ]1, ,i i imA a a= K
( )V A• o  va ue unc on  s:




( ) ( )
1
m
i j j ij
j
V A w v a
=
= ∑ = MOE
8
Vendor’s Decision Problem  
• For each possible budget level, b, Vendor i’s 





( ) ( )
1
i j j ij
j













• For simplicity analysis assumes: ,  
Two attributes
Two vendors
• Vendors can differ in their cost functions
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Traditional Price & Performance Bid
Value (MOE) and Cost
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Individual Vendor Offers over a Range of Budgets















–Optimal vendor choice can change with 
changes in the budget   
Large & rising federal debt results in–        
shrinking discretionary defense budget
=> Increasing Budget Uncertainty
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Budget Uncertainty 
If we can assign probabilities to•       
the possible budget levels, we can 
use expected utility as a vendor 
selection metric for the economic    
evaluation of alternatives
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Vendor Selection Metric (VSM)
• Vendor Selection Metric (VSM) is an 
t d tilit f ti th t d dexpec e  u y unc on a  epen s 
on:
a) the decision maker’s beliefs of the 
likelihood of each budget level    
b) the relative preferences of the 
attributes offered, and 
c) attitude toward risk  
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Suppose DoD believes these are the probabilities 
associated with each funding level
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Vendor Selection Metric (VSM):
• Given these probabilities for the six budget 
levels and assumptions about DoD’s value      
function and risk aversion, the vendor selection 
metric is: 
• 0.771 if vendor 1 is selected
• 0.800 if vendor 2 is selected  
This new metric suggests DoD should select•        
vendor 2
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Vendor 1 Wins with 

















Vendor 2's BidLimited Funding
Vendor 2 Wins with 
Budget= $5
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The buyer's utility function and the value and corresponding utility offered by each 
d f th i b d t i i th d i i d t i t l
       
(0.10) MOE
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ven or  or e s x u ge  scenar os n e ec s on un er uncer a n y examp e.
Interpretation of Results:
• Dividing new vendor selection metric (VSM) into 
component parts provides additional insight. 
• Even though Vendor 2 wins, the VSM values for 
each vendor are fairly close: 
• Vendor 1 = 0.771, and Vendor 2 = 0.800
H f b d l l $1 $20 $2 d $30– owever, or u get eve s 5, , 5, an  , 
the bundle of attributes provided by vendor 1 is 
more desirable and there is a 75% probability one ,        
of these budget levels will be realized!
– But there is a 10% probability of a serious budget          




• Such insights would be impossible to      
obtain with only a single bid from each 
endor sa for the most likel b dget bv , y    y u ,  = 
$15, with a probability of 0.35.  
• More revealing and robust analysis is only 
feasible if DoD solicits vendor offers over 
multiple budget levels and assesses the 
likelihood of those budgets.  
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Recommendations
• Allow vendors to submit bids for a range        
of possible funding levels
F ll F di O i i i P i l F di M Lik l Li i d– u  un ng= pt m st c; art a  un ng= ost e y; m te  
Funding=Pessimistic.
Instead of ie ing each endor as a single•   v w   v     
point in cost-effectiveness space, it is 
important to solicit vendor offers at 
different levels of affordability.
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Recommendations
• A vendor whose bid is dominated at one budget         
level could be the winner at another budget 
level.  
• This makes it vital for procurement agencies to 
thi k t diti l bli t bid li it tire n  ra ona  pu c sec or  so c a ons.  
• Develop expansion paths to illustrate how each 
vendor’s offer changes with changes in funding.  
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Recommendations
• With increased budget uncertainty, assign a 
probability distribution over possible budgets 
(funding/affordability levels).
• Develop a Vendor Selection Metric (VSM)     
that captures budget uncertainty and DoD’s 
attitude towards risk  . 
• Calculate VSM value for each set of vendor 
proposals and use to guide vendor selection       
decisions. STOP
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Suppose the buyer has the exponential expected 
utility function below where, as previously specified, V
varies between zero and one over the possible attribute         
bundles.  This vendor selection metric (VSM) represents 
a decision-maker who is risk averse.
Note that since the minimum value of V is zero and the maximum is one, U(V) also 
varies between zero and one.  We chose the exponential function because it has 
constant absolute risk aversion, measured by a risk tolerance parameter (in this 
case, 0.5), making its assessment reasonably straightforward.  It is commonly used 
in decisions under uncertainty.
2V( ) 1 eU V −−= 21 e−−
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Examples
• Let the vendors have cost functions of the        
form:
, where( ) ij ijaij ij ijc a eβα= , 0ij ijα β >
• B1=5, B2=10, B3=15, B4=20, B5=25, B6=30
• We will examine several cases where the 
vendors differ in their cost functions and/or 
beliefs about the weight the buyer places on 
the attributes
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Solution to Vendor’s Problem   
• A vendor’s best offer (bid) will consist of the         
combinations of attribute levels that use the 
entire possible budgets, and satisfy the 
condition:
1 2i iw w
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• This set of offers from a vendor constitutes an 
“expansion path”
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